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SEEING THE APPELLATE HORIZON: CIVIL TRIAL
STRATEGY AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN THE
EIGHTH CIRCUIT
R. Christopher Lawson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Some practitioners view the standard of review on appeal
as an issue that need not be addressed until after an appellate
argument has been drafted. For them, the standard of review is a
mere afterthought that results in a paragraph dropped into the
beginning of the brief to comply with a rule. For the "farsighted
practitioner,"' however, the standard of review is just the
opposite. It is the filter through which a litigator's best and worst
moments at trial are judged. It is the "first question that cries out
* Member, Friday, Eldredge & Clark, Little Rock, Arkansas.
1. Steven Alan Childress & Martha S. Davis, Federal Standards of Review, 1.24 (3d
ed., Lexis 1999).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS Vol. 4, No. 2 (Fall 2002)
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
for [an] answer,"' the blueprint for success on appeal, and the
tool that shapes every winning argument. In sum, the standard of
review can be either the lawyer's best friend or his worst enemy.
This article does not seek to catalog the infinite number of
issues that arise in the appellate context. Instead, its purpose is
to identify certain common situations in which the standards of
review in the Eighth Circuit shape not only appellate strategy,
but civil trial strategy as well. To be sure, the standards of
review do not conveniently "fit into a checklist format." 3 Nor
are they susceptible of precise definition in every context.4 They
are discussed here within the framework of issues that
commonly arise during the course of a trial. They reveal the
answer to the "first question" of appellate practice: No trial
lawyer can afford to overlook the importance of the standards of
review, for they will one day be the lens through which his
client's day in court will be examined.!
II. STATING THE STANDARD
Most lawyers cringe at the thought of discovering in an
appellate opinion that a case has been decided on the basis of an
issue never addressed in the brief. Unfortunately, it happens.
And the standard of review can be the critical issue left
unaddressed.6 Lawyers must take care to insure that the standard
of review is properly addressed and explained in their briefs.
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, as revised in
1993, require the appellant's brief to recite the applicable
standard of review. Under Rule 28, a "concise statement of the
applicable standard of review" must be included for each issue
2. Barry Sullivan, Standards of Review, in Appellate Advocacy 59, 60 (Peter J. Carre,
Azike A. Ntephe & Helen C. Trainor eds., ABA 1981).
3. Steven Alan Childress, A Standards of Review Primer. Federal Civil Appeals, 125
F.R.D. 319, 321 (1989).
4. "In law as elsewhere words of many-hued meaning derive their scope from the use
to which they are put." Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 529 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
5. "To ignore at trial the reality of review is to ignore the direct decision makers and
to tempt Murphy's Law." Childress & Davis, supra n. 1, at 1.25.
6. See e.g. Fox v. Conmmr. of Internal Revenue, 718 F.2d 251, 253 (7th Cir. 1983)
("The critical issue in this case is one not discussed by the parties: our standard of
review.").
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raised on appeal.7 The statement may appear within the
appellant's argument or under a separate heading before the
discussion of an issue. This requirement reflects the sound
principle that an accurate statement of the standard "generally
results in arguments that are properly shaped in light of the
standard." 8
III. PRE-TRIAL RULINGS
In cases big and small, issues on appeal often arise from
rulings made before trial. While pre-trial skirmishes do not lend
themselves to quiet reflection about a post-trial appeal, a trial
lawyer should not forget that the nature of the dispute dictates
the eventual level of scrutiny by an appellate court. Often the
dispute implicates the "discretion" of the trial judge. If so, the
trial judge's ruling, no matter how critical to the scope and
course of the trial, will not easily serve as reversible error.
In the heat of battle, for example, a pre-trial ruling on the
admissibility of evidence may be perceived as the pivotal issue
at trial. Because the scope of the trial can hinge on the
admissibility of the evidence, a motion in limine is filed. The
parties must vigorously defend their positions at a pre-trial
hearing. A trial lawyer is well-advised to remember that the
outcome of this pre-trial battle is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. Although the trial court's
discretionary rulings are certainly not unassailable on appeal,9
the hurdle for reversal is high. As one distinguished appellate
judge has pointed out, the lawyer who "blindly challenges on
appeal the exercise of discretion might do better to take a
leisurely stroll through an uncharted minefield." 0
7. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(B).
8. Advisory Committee Notes, 1993 Amend., Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(5).
9. Kern v. TXO Production Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding an abuse
of discretion where the trial court considered an improper factor and failed to evaluate
pertinent factors).
10. Ruggero J. Aldisert, Winning On Appeal 66 (rev. 1st ed., Natl. Inst. Tr. Advoc.
1996).
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A. Abuse of Discretion
The abuse of discretion standard is applied to situations
where the "formulation of legal rules [is] difficult or
impossible" and the trial court has "superior knowledge of the
issues, the record, the proceedings and the personalities."" An
abuse of discretion "will be found only when the trial court's
decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly
erroneous assessment of the evidence." 2 In general, an abuse of
discretion 3 occurs when (1) a relevant factor that should have
been given significant weight is not considered, (2) an irrelevant
or improper factor is considered and given significant weight, or
(3) all proper factors, and no improper ones, are considered, but
the trial court commits clear error of judgment in weighing those
factors. 4 As explained by Judge Richard Arnold, the phrase
"abuse of discretion" means "that the court has a range of
choice, and that its decision will not be disturbed as long as it
stays within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of
law." 5 The trial court is thus given a "zone of choice within
which [it] may go either way." 6
B. De Novo Review
In contrast to rulings on the admissibility of evidence, the
trial court's determination of purely legal issues has no
advantage at the appellate level. Such determinations are
reviewed de novo, which is sometimes referred to in the Eighth
Circuit as plenary review. This means the trial court's rulings on
11. George A. Somerville, Standards of Appellate Review, in Appellate Practice
Manual 20, 20 (Priscilla Anne Schwab ed., ABA Sec. Litig. 1992).
12. Richards v. Aramark Servs., Inc., 108 F.3d 925, 927 (8th Cir. 1997).
13. Discretion has been defined as follows:
That part of the judicial function which decides questions arising in the trial of a
cause, according to the particular circumstances of each case, and as to which
the judgment of the court is uncontrolled by fixed rules of law.
The power exercised by courts to determine questions to which no strict rule of
law is applicable but which, from their nature, and the circumstances of the case,
are controlled by the personal judgment of the court.
Bouvier's Law Dictionary, vol. 1 884 (3d rev., 8th ed., West 1914)
14. Richards, 108 F.3d at 927.
15. Kern, 738 F.2d at 970.
16. Id. at971.
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purely legal issues are subject to independent appellate review
with no deference. 7 The Eighth Circuit may affirm the trial
court, however, on any basis supported by the record.'8
C. Discovery Rulings
The trial court has broad latitude in matters relating to pre-
trial discovery. The court's discovery orders are reviewed "very
narrowly" by the Eighth Circuit and will be upheld "unless
there was a 'gross abuse of discretion resulting in fundamental
unfairness in the trial of the case."' 19 The bottom line is that the
trial court, as discovery referee, will not be overturned unless its
rulings (even if incorrect) had a demonstrable impact on the
outcome of the trial.
D. Preliminary Injunctions
As standards of review do not fit into a tidy checklist of
situational rules, the dichotomy between abuse of discretion and
de novo review is only a starting point for grasping the overall
significance of these standards. How, for example, will the
Eighth Circuit review the trial court's denial of a motion for
preliminary injunction? Is the issue one of law or fact? The short
answer is that the denial of a motion for preliminary injunction
is reviewed for abuse of discretion.0 Yet, the trial court's
disposition of the motion naturally includes a legal conclusion:
whether the moving party is likely to succeed on the merits. This
legal issue is independently reviewed de novo on appeal.2 The
appellant should always be on alert to the possibility that
"[l]egal error can be embedded in an apparently discretionary
17. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982) ("[11f a district court's
findings rest on an erroneous view of the law, they may be set aside on that basis.").
18. McKay v. WilTel Commun. Sys., Inc., 87 F.3d 970, 975 (8th Cir. 1996).
19. Derby v. Godfather's Pizza, Inc., 45 F.3d 1212, 1215 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 921 F.2d 765, 768 (8th Cir. 1990)); see Kindead v. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co., 49 F.3d 454, 457 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that the standard of review
for the trial court's refusal to compel discovery is gross abuse of discretion).
20. Couteau Properties Co. v. Dept. of Interior, 53 F.3d 1466, 1472 (8th Cir. 1995).
21. Id.
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decision."22 Moreover, the trial court's treatment of an issue as
one of law or fact is not entitled to deference on appeal.23
E. Common Motions to Dismiss
The farsighted trial lawyer should also remember the
standards of review for common pre-trial orders involving
motions to dismiss. For example, an order of the trial court that
grants a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) will be reviewed de
novo on appeal.24  The Eighth Circuit will "construe the
allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable" to the
plaintiff, and will affirm the dismissal only if "it appears beyond
doubt that [the plaintiff] can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief. ' 25 Likewise, the
Court will review de novo an order of the trial court dismissing a
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.26
The dismissal of an action under Rule 41(b) for failure to
prosecute or to comply with an order of the trial court is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.27 Yet, because dismissals under
Rule 41(b) operate as an adjudication on the merits, the Eighth
Circuit does not look favorably upon them: "Dismissals with
prejudice are drastic and extremely harsh sanctions. Cases
should be dismissed with prejudice only where the plaintiff has
intentionally delayed the action or where the plaintiff has
consistently and willfully failed to prosecute his [or her]
claim." 
28
F. Summary Judgment
The Eighth Circuit reviews the trial court's grant of
22. Somerville, supra n. 11, at 21.
23. Stevens v. Employer-Teamsters Joint Council, 979 F.2d 444, 458 (6th Cir. 1992).
24. Dover Elevator Co. v. Ark. St. Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 445 (8th Cir. 1995).
25. Carney v. Houston, 33 F.3d 893, 894 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (quoting Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
26. Gopher Oil Co. v. Bunker, 84 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 1996).
27. Wright v. Sargent, 869 F.2d 1175, 1176 (8th Cir. 1989) (considering whether trial
court's exercise of its inherent power to dismiss was an abuse of discretion).
28. Miller v Benson, 51 F.3d 166, 168 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting Sterling v. U.S., 985
F.2d 411,412 (8th Cir. 1993)).
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summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and affirming only if
there are no genuine issues of material fact such that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.z9 Sitting in
diversity, the Eighth Circuit applies the substantive law of the
applicable state.30
G. Jury Selection: The Batson Challenge
Occasionally, the trial court's denial of a Batson challenge
to a peremptory strike of a potential juror will be an issue on
appeal.3' The trial court's findings on the issue of purposeful
discrimination largely turn on credibility determinations and are
afforded great deference by the Eighth Circuit.32 Thus, the trial
court's finding that the exclusion of a juror was not motivated
by racial discrimination will only be reversed if the court's
"findings were clearly erroneous." 33
IV. RULINGS AT TRIAL
A. Evidentiary Rulings
The standard of review for evidentiary issues decided
during trial is, of course, the same as the trial court's ruling on a
motion in limine.34 The. Eighth Circuit will only reverse the
29. Bryan v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 154 F.3d 899, 901 (8th Cir. 1998); see also Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
30. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
31. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Court held that the exercise of
peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans from the jury in a criminal case
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court extended
the reasoning of Batson to civil cases in Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614 (1991).
32. Doss v. Frontenac, 14 F.3d 1313, 1317 (8th Cir. 1994).
33. Id. at 1316.
34. The 2000 amendment to Rule 103(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows a
party to appeal the pre-trial denial of a motion in limine, even if the party does not object to
the introduction of the evidence at trial. This represents a departure from Eighth Circuit
practice and procedure. The Eighth Circuit had previously held that a motion in limine does
not preserve error for appellate review. Peerless Corp. v. U.S., 185 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir.
1999) (reaffirming that when "a motion to exclude evidence is made in limine and is
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evidentiary rulings of the trial court upon a finding that the court
engaged in a "clear and prejudicial" abuse of discretion.35 An
abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court excludes
evidence of a critical nature, so that there is no reasonable
assurance that the jury would have reached the same conclusion
had the evidence been admitted.36 Even if the admission of
evidence is found to be an abuse of discretion, the Eighth Circuit
will affirm the trial court if there is substantial evidence other
than the questioned evidence that supports the jury's verdict. 37
B. Motion for Directed Verdict
As the Eighth Circuit's decision in Country Shindig Opry,
Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co,3" indicates, the standard by which the
Eighth Circuit reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion for
directed verdict is the same as its review of a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict:
To assess whether a ruling on a motion for a directed
verdict was proper, the courts consider the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party, assuming as
true all facts that the prevailing party's evidence tended to
prove and giving him the benefit of all favorable inferences
that reasonably may be drawn from the proven facts. Brown
v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 703 F.2d 1050, 1052 (8th Cir.
1983). If, in light of the above, reasonable jurors could
differ as to the conclusions that could be drawn from the
evidence, the court must deny the motion for a directed
verdict.39
Importantly, in reviewing the trial court's ruling, the Eighth
overruled, if the evidence is thereafter admitted at trial without objection, 'the error if any,
has not been preserved for review"' (quoting Huff v. Heckendorn Mfg. Co., 991 F.2d 464,
466 (8th Cir. 1993))).
35. King v. Ahrens, 16 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Cummings v. Malone,
995 F.2d 817, 823 (8th Cir. 1993)); see Lamb Engr. & Const. v. Nebraska Pub. Power, 103
F.3d 1422, 1432 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that "great deference" should be afforded to the
trial court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence) (quoting U.S. v. Jackson, 914 F.2d
1050, 1053 (8th Cir. 1990)).
36. King, 16 F.3d at 268 (quoting Adams v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 820 F.2d 271, 273 (8th
Cir. 1987)).
37. Buchanna v. Diehl Mach., Inc., 98 F.3d 366, 372 (8th Cir. 1996).
38. 780 F.2d 1408 (8th Cir. 1986).
39. Id. at 1411.
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Circuit will not consider the record as a whole. It will only
review the evidence favoring the nonmoving party. 40
Likewise, if a party appeals the trial court's denial of a
motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Eighth Circuit's
review is de novo but "deferential to the jury's verdict.",4' The
Court will "resolve all factual conflicts in favor of the
nonmoving party, giving that party the benefit of all reasonable
inferences and assuming as true all facts favoring that party
which the evidence tended to prove. 42 Thus, the Court will
affirm the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law "if
a reasonable jury could differ as to the conclusions that could be
drawn [from the evidence]." 43
C. Jury Instructions
1. Deferential Review
The Eighth Circuit applies "a deferential standard when
reviewing a [trial] court's jury instructions, reversing only for an
abuse of discretion." 44 If the appellant challenges the trial
court's failure "to give a requested instruction, the omission is
error only if the requested instruction is correct, not adequately
covered by the charge given, and involves a point so important
that failure to give the instruction seriously impaired the party's
ability to present an effective case. 45 Stated another way, the
Eighth Circuit considers whether the instructions, "taken as a
whole and viewed in light of the evidence and the applicable
law, fairly and adequately submitted the issues in the case to the
jury., 46 This standard of review has been described as the
"harmless error rule," under which "the appellant generally has
40. Dace v. ACF Indus., Inc., 722 F.2d 374, 376 (8th Cir. 1983).
41. Three River Telco v. TSFL Holding Corp., Inc., 300 F.3d 924, 927 (8th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 689-690 (8th Cir. 1997)).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Thomlison v. City of Omaha, 63 F.3d 786, 790-791 (8th Cir. 1995); see also
Hoselton v. Metz Baking Co., 48 F.3d 1056, 1062 (8th Cir. 1995).
45. Thomlison, 63 F.3d at 791.
46. Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1485 (8th Cir. 1996)
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the burden of establishing the prejudicial effect of the trial
court's refusal to give a requested instruction." 
47
2. Failure to Object
If a party fails to object to the trial court's denial of a
proposed instruction, the Eighth Circuit will reverse only if the
41failure to give the proposed instruction amounts to plain error.
As many appellants have learned, the plain error exception is a
narrow gate. The Eighth Circuit applies the doctrine only in
exceptional cases when strict criteria are met. 9 Plain error will
only be found if the trial court's ruling "is error affecting
substantial rights, the error is plain, and the error seriously
affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings."50 The Eighth Court has also defined plain error as
an error that is "clear" or "obvious." 5'
The Eighth Circuit's treatment of jury instructions demands
special vigilance at the jury instruction conference in keeping
with Rule 51." If the conference is held in chambers, counsel
should insist that a court reporter be present. Lawyers must not
be lulled into a conciliatory mode at this late stage of the trial.
They must make an objection to each instruction approved by
the trial court that they believe to be improper, and must proffer
alternative instructions when necessary. This can be a tedious
process, particularly when the trial is long and the parties are
relieved to have the evidentiary phase of the trial completed, but
it must be done. 3
47. Bersett v. K-Mart Corp., 869 F.2d 1131, 1135 (8th Cir. 1989).
48. Farmland Indus. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc., 871 F.2d 1402, 1408 (8th
Cir. 1989) (holding that only a plain error analysis is necessary where a party "never
objected on the record" to the trial court's failure to give the requested instructions).
49. Bd. of Waterworks Trustees v. Alvord, Burdich & Howson, 706 F.2d 820, 824 (8th
Cir. 1983).
50. Caviness v. Nucor-Yamato Steel Co., 105 F.3d 1216, 1220 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal
quotations omitted).
51. Starks v. Rent-A-Center, 58 F.3d 358, 363 (8th Cir. 1995).
52. "No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless
that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the
matter objected to and the grounds of the objection." Fed. R. Civ. P. 51.
53. See Starks, 58 F.3d at 362 (noting that in the Eighth Circuit, a "concern that the
trial judge would prefer no objection or the view that the objection would be futile does not
relieve parties from making an objection to preserve errors for review").
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D. Closing Argument
The Eighth Circuit will not reverse the trial court's rulings
on the propriety of closing argument absent an abuse of
discretion. 4 Furthermore, a statement made in closing argument
does not constitute reversible error unless it is "plainly
unwarranted and clearly injurious."" Thus, in challenging a trial
court's ruling on the propriety of closing argument, a
complaining party must do more than establish that counsel's
argument was improper. That party must also "make a concrete
showing of prejudice resulting from the argument." 56 As with
other discretionary rulings, a finding that the trial court
committed error does not justify reversal. The hurdle for
challenging an improper closing argument is indeed high. The
appellant must establish a nexus between the improper argument
and the verdict actually reached by the jury.
E. Findings of Fact
1. Bench Trial
The lens through which a trial court's findings of fact are
examined on appeal is codified in Rule 52." The strength of the
lens, however, is not so clear in practice. Rule 52 provides that
" [flindings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge of the credibility of the witnesses."58 Judge Learned Hand
offered perhaps the best assessment of the "clearly erroneous"
54. Kostelec v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 64 F.3d 1220, 1228 (8th Cir. 1995).
55. Boardman v. Natl. Med. Enters., 106 F.3d 840, 844 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Vanskike v. Union P. R. R. Co., 725 F.2d 1146, 1149 (8th Cir. 1984)).
56. Vanskike, 725 F.2d at 1149; see Lovett v. Union P. R.R. Co., 201 F.3d 1074, 1082-
83 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that the defendant's closing argument "may have been
improper," but affirming a verdict for the defendant because the plaintiff "failed to
demonstrate that she was prejudiced").
57. See Aldisert, supra n. 10, at 57 (noting that standards of review "determine the
power of the lens through which the appellate court may examine a particular issue in a
case").
58. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (emphasis added).
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standard:
It is idle to try to define the meaning of the phrase "clearly
erroneous"; all that can be profitably said is that an
appellate court, though it will hesitate less to reverse the
finding of a judge than that of an administrative tribunal or
of a jury, will nevertheless reverse it most reluctantly and
only when well persuaded.59
Following the lead of the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,60 the Eighth Circuit
has adopted the familiar test that findings of fact will only be
reversed if the Court is "left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed."6 Yet, the Court
has struggled with the precise formula for arriving at a "firm
conviction" about the evidence, sometimes merging the clearly
erroneous standard with the substantial evidence test, much to
the confusion of many appellate lawyers."
While the Court will apply Rule 52 to pay its "due regard"
to the trial court, the Court does not regard the findings of the
trial court with the same deference it pays to a jury verdict. As
Judge Mehaffy explained in Jackson, the Court is afforded
"greater latitude" when reviewing the trial court's findings of
fact:
The clearly erroneous concept ... affords a greater latitude
[of review] than would an appeal from a jury verdict. In the
latter it is a question of substantial evidence. In the former,
there is still the qualitative factor of the truth and right of
the case-the impression that a fundamentally wrong result
has been reached.63
59. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir. 1945).
60. 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
61. Chakeles v. Commr. of Internal Revenue, 79 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 1996).
62. Akeyo v. O'Hanlon, 75 F.3d 370, 373 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that a factual finding
that is supported by substantial evidence in the record is not clearly erroneous); Jackson v.
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 422 F.2d 1272, 1275 (8th Cir. 1970) ("We have no
right to set aside a finding of fact of the trial court unless there is no substantial evidence to
sustain it, unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or unless it was induced by
an erroneous view of the law") (quoting Christensen v. Great Plains Gas. Co., 418 F.2d
995, 998 (8th Cir. 1969)).
63. Jackson, 422 F.2d at 1278 (emphasis in original) (quoting Oil Screw Noah's Ark v.
Bentley & Felton Corp., 322 F.2d 3, 5-6 (5th Cir. 1963)).
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Therefore, "evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict or
an administrative finding may not suffice to support a trial
judge's finding."64 But even with this distinction, the lesson for
the practitioner is that a trial court's findings of fact, though not
unassailable, will only be reversed for a clear and definite
mistake.65 The Eighth Circuit "will not retry issues of fact"
because the "power of a trial court to decide doubtful issues of
fact is not limited to deciding them correctly."66 The Court will
affirm the trial court even if it is "quite possible" that a different
67
conclusion would have been reached applying de novo review.
2. Jury Trial
In our system of justice, the province of the jury is sacred.
This sentiment is reflected in the Eighth Circuit's review of jury
verdicts. Factual findings by the jury will not be reversed if the
verdict is supported by "substantial evidence" in the record.66
Thus, a jury's verdict will be affirmed unless, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, a
reasonable jury could not have found for that party.69
F. Mixed Questions of Law and Fact
A mixed question of law and fact involves the application
of an established rule of law to specific facts.70 Generally, mixed
questions of law and fact "that require the consideration of legal
concepts and the exercise of judgment about the values
underlying legal principles" are reviewed de novo.7' An example
of this type of review is found in Cooper Tire, in which the
64. Id. (quoting Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 540 (2nd Cir. 1950)).
65. The ability to challenge a trial court's factual findings on appeal is even less clear
in the Seventh Circuit, where one panel stated that a trial court's finding is clearly
erroneous only if it "strike[s] us as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated
dead fish." Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir.
1988).
66. Cleo Syrup Corp. v. Coca-Cola Co., 139 F.2d 416, 417 (8th Cir. 1943).
67. SquirtCo. v. The Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980).
68. Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 362 (8th Cir. 1986).
69. Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 53 F.3d 899, 904 (8th Cir. 1995).
70. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
71. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 365, 369
(8th Cir. 1995).
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Eighth Circuit reversed the trial court's determination that an
employee had breached the terms of an ERISA plan.72
Notwithstanding the general application of de novo review
to mixed questions of law and fact, the Eighth Circuit has
recognized that the determination of citizenship for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction "is a mixed question of law and fact, but
mainly fact, which may not be set aside by an appellate court
unless clearly erroneous."73 Moreover, in Boe v. United States,74
the Court found that the appellant was not entitled to a trial de
novo on the issue of negligence, even though the appellant
argued that the issue of negligence was a mixed question of law
and fact. The Court affirmed on the basis that the trial court's
71findings of fact were not clearly erroneous.
G. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
The trial court's denial of a motion for judgment as a
matter of law is reviewed de novo 6 Accordingly,
[i]n determining whether there exists sufficient evidence to
support the jury verdict, we must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party, remembering
that "judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only when
all of the evidence points one way and is susceptible of no
reasonable inference sustaining the position of the
nonmoving party." 
77
72. Id. at 367-69; see also Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 609-11
(8th Cir. 1997) (reviewing de novo the issue of whether a school district had offered a
"free appropriate public education" within the meaning of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act).
73. Holmes v. Sopuch, 639 F.2d 431, 434 (8th Cir. 1981).
74. 352 F.2d 551 (8th Cir. 1965).
75. Id. at 552-553.
76. Keenan v. Computer Assoc. Intl., Inc., 13 F.3d 1266, 1268 (8th Cir. 1994).
77. Porous Media Corp v. Pall Corp., 110 F.3d 1329, 1337-38 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Keenan, 13 F.3d at 1269).
CIVIL TRIAL STRATEGY AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
V. POST-TRIAL RULINGS
A. Motion for New Trial
1. Generally
The trial court's denial of a motion for new trial under Rule
59 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 8 If the trial court denies
the motion because the verdict is not against the weight of the
evidence, the denial of the motion is "virtually unassailable" on
appeal.7 9 If the trial court grants a motion for new trial, it "must
adequately articulate its reasons for overturning a jury verdict"
so that the Eighth Circuit "can exercise a meaningful degree of
scrutiny and safeguard parties' right to a jury trial."8° In
applying the abuse of discretion standard, the Court will closely
guard the role of the jury:
On a motion for new trial, the district court is entitled to
interpret the evidence and judge the credibility of
witnesses, but it may not usurp the role of the jury by
granting a new trial simply because it believes other
inferences and conclusions are more reasonable .... A new
trial is appropriate if the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence and if allowing it to stand would result in a
miscarriage of justice.8"
2. Excessive Damages
The Eighth Circuit's determination of whether the damages
awarded in a diversity case are excessive is governed by state
law.82 A verdict is excessive under Arkansas law, for example,
only if "the amount shocks the conscience of the court or
78. Id. at 1338.
79. Id. (quoting Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., 72 F.3d 648, 656 (8th Cir. 1995)).
80. Van SteenBurgh v. Rival Co., 171 F.3d 1155, 1160 (8th Cir. 1999) (citations
omitted).
81. Id. (citations omitted).
82. Sanford v. Crittenden Meml. Hosp., 141 F.3d 882, 884 (8th Cir. 1998).
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demonstrates that the jurors were motivated by passion,
prejudice or undue influence."83
B. Attorney's Fees
Before the dust has settled on many trials, the parties find
themselves in disagreement on whether the trial court has the
authority to award attorney's fees. The Eighth Circuit reviews
the trial court's award of fees and costs for abuse of discretion.84
Factual findings concerning the fee issue, however, will not be
disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Applicable legal
issues decided by the trial court are subject to plenary review.
VI. CONCLUSION
No trial can be perfect. Indeed, litigants are "entitled to a
fair trial but not to a perfect one." 16 Likewise, the lens through
which the trial record is viewed on appeal is not always crystal
clear. Nevertheless, every trial must be viewed as a momentous
event from beginning to end, and lawyers should not limit their
view of the landscape to the trial itself; they must see the
"appellate horizon,"87 which will be colored by the applicable
standards of review. As Justice White once pointed out,
standards of review are therefore "of far more than academic
interest."8 They truly are the lawyer's best friend, or his worst
enemy.
83. Id. (quoting White v. Mitchell, 568 S.W.2d 216 (Ark. 1978)).
84. Pinkham v. Mary Ellen Enters., Inc., 84 F.3d 292, 294 (8th Cir. 1996).
85. Id.
86. Somerville, supra n. 11, at 20.
87. Childress & Davis, supra n. I, at 1.24.
88. Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of Am., 459 U.S. 1007, 1009 (1982) (White, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (characterizing standard of review as "influential, if not
dispositive" ).
